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1. Introduction
Question words show striking similarities among the languages of the world: They
are typically morphologically related to indeﬁnites and they are typically, if not
universally, focused.1 These two properties have been semantically accounted for
in various ways, but so far they have not been integrated into a single coherent
theory. I will show that an integration can be achieved by combining two indepen-
dently motivated accounts, which up to now have not been considered together. The
analysis arrived at will be shown to yield a number of answerhood conditions that
are left unexplained by the pertinent semantic theories of questions and to explain
intervention effects in wh-questions.
2. Some Facts about Question Words
2.1. Question Words are Closely Related to Indeﬁnites
Indeﬁnite and interrogative pronouns are typically closely related in form (Haspel-
math 1997, Bhat 2000).2 Among the languages that show this relationship, we can
identify two major classes: In the ﬁrst class, indeﬁnite and interrogative pronouns
are identical in form.3 In the second class, indeﬁnite pronouns are derived from
interrogative pronouns. I will concentrate on the ﬁrst class, because I consider the
identity of indeﬁnite and interrogative pronouns as the basic phenomenon.4
For an illustration of the indeﬁnite-interrogative afﬁnity, consider the ex-
ample in (1), which is a string of Lakhota words. This string has two readings,
a yes/no-question and a wh-question reading (see the paraphrases in (1a) and (b),
respectively).
I am grateful to the audience of SALT XVIII for their helpful comments. I owe special thanks
to Adrian Brasoveanu, Paul Elbourne, and Anna Szabolcsi for giving me ideas for future research.
1In addition to this, question words usually form a morphologically distinct class, for example,
the class of wh-words in English. For reasons of space, I will not discuss this property.
2Here and below, I use “pronoun” in the broad sense of Haspelmath (1997), including pro-
adverbs and determiners.
3To be precise, the formal identity holds except for the focus feature borne by the interrogative
occurrences of these pronouns. See section 2.2 for discussion.
4See Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) for an analysis that takes the derivational relationship be-
tween various pronoun paradigms as starting point. See Haida (2007) for a thorough comparison of
this approach with the dynamic-semantic approach to be presented here.
© 2008 by Andreas Haida. T. Friedman and S. Ito (eds.), SALT XVIII, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.(1) ˇ s´ u ¸ka
dog
ki
the
t´ aku
something/what
yaxt´ aka
bit
he
Q
a. ‘Did the dog bite something?’
b. ‘What did the dog bite?’
Note that on the ﬁrst reading, the pronoun t´ aku functions as an indeﬁnite, and on
the second as a question word.
Observations like this5 suggest that interrogative pronouns have the same
denotation as the corresponding indeﬁnite pronouns. Therefore, I assume that wh-
phrases denote existential generalized quantiﬁers (cf. Karttunen 1977). In this pa-
per, I use a provisional translation procedure between natural-language expressions
and expressions of a logical calculus to avoid confusion when discussing the mean-
ing of the latter (see section 3).6 Thus, for example, the wh-pronoun whon is given
the following translation (where n is a numerical index).7
(2) whon    P. un.P(i)(un)
As will be argued in section 2.3, the existential quantiﬁer in (2) must be a dynamic
quantiﬁer. Hence, the term in (2) and the logical expressions discussed in the fol-
lowing sections are expressions of a dynamic type logic. This logic will be speciﬁed
in section 3.2 and 3.3.
2.2. Question Words are Focused
There is more to be said about the ambiguity of (1). According to Van Valin (1993:
98), the two readings are disambiguated by the location of the focus: (1) is inter-
preted as a constituent question if and only if the focus falls on the pronoun t´ aku.
Put differently, t´ aku functions as a question word if and only if it is focused. Here,
being “focused” is to be understood, ﬁrst of all, in the formal sense of the term, but
I will argue in a minute that question words are focused in a semantic sense too.
The focusing of question words has been observed in a large variety of lan-
guages, and it is also recognized that this phenomenon is very widespread or even
universal (see, for example, ´ E. Kiss 1995: 23). However, so far little attention has
been paid to the question of what interpretation the focus feature borne by ques-
tion words receives (for a notable exception, see Beck 2006). To approach this
question, let us consider the syntactic distribution of question words in Hungarian.
The paradigm in (3) shows that question contituents must occur in the immediate
preverbal position, which is the focus position in Hungarian (´ E. Kiss 1998: 249).8
5The phenomenon under consideration can also be observed in German (Zaefferer 1991), Korean
(Choe 1995), and a number of other languages (Haspelmath 1997).
6Once the relevant semantic objects are established, natural-language expressions (viz. LF struc-
tures) should be directly related to their denotations.
7I assume for simplicity that wh-pronouns do not have a restriction.
8This does not hold for mi´ ert ‘why’, for reasons that are unclear to me. Also see section 4.2 for
the syntax multiple questions in Hungarian.
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the
huzat
draft
[melyik
which
szoba
room’s
ablakait]
windows.ACC
t¨ orte
broke
be?
in
‘The windows of which room did the draft break?’
b. [Melyik szoba ablakait] t¨ orte be a huzat?
c. * [Melyik szoba ablakait] a huzat t¨ orte be?
d. * [Melyik szoba ablakait] be t¨ orte a huzat?
e. * A huzat [melyik szoba ablakait] be t¨ orte?
I propose to take the distributional facts of Hungarian at face value. In Szabolcsi
(1981), it is shown that preverbal focus constituents receive an exhaustive interpre-
tation. Let us assume that this also holds for question constituents. I propose that
exhaustiﬁcation is achieved by the semantics of a speciﬁc focus feature Fe, and that
in Hungarian, this feature must be syntactically licensed in the preverbal focus po-
sition. Following Szabolcsi (1994), I assume that the Fe feature translates into the
term given in (4).
(4) Fe    Q P.Q(i)( i   (   =   .P(i)( )))
The operator in (4) turns a generalized quantiﬁer into the corresponding exhaustive
generalized quantiﬁer. This is achieved by means of the  -operator, which is de-
ﬁned slightly differently here than in Link (1983), namely as described in (5).9, 10
(5)   .P(i)( ) is the maximal sum individual
that satisﬁes the plural predicate of   .P(i)( )
Note that the  -operator presupposes the existence of a maximal sum individual.
This means that the  -term in (5) is undeﬁned if P has an empty extension at the
index assigned to i. Now consider in (6) the translation of the focused wh-pronoun
whon
Fe (where    is the translation of  ).
(6) whon
Fe   Fe
 ( i.whon
 )
=[  Q P.Q(i)( i   (   =   .P(i)( )))]( i P. un.P(i)(un))
=  P. un(un =   .P(i)( ))
Due to the  -operator, the generalized quantiﬁer derived in (6) does not give a
deﬁned result if it applies to a property that has an empty extension at the index
assigned to i. This will later be shown to be the source of a number of answerhood
conditions and to lead to intervention effects in wh-questions.
2.3. Question Words are Dynamic Binders
VanRooy(1998)observesthatquestionwordscanserveasantecedentsforanaphoric
pronouns. This is illustrated in (7) with an example of discourse anaphora.
9For a proper deﬁnition, see Haida (2007).
10According to Link (1983), the  -operator gives the maximal sum individual that satisﬁes the
predicate it applies to. One reason to assume instead a deﬁnition along the lines of (5) is that
wh-pronouns without a plural form can have a plural interpretation. See section 4.3 for relevant
discussion.
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We also ﬁnd cases of donkey anaphora, that is, anaphoric binding in the scope of an
operator that lends universal force to the anaphoric binder. The double question in
(8) provides an example of this type of anaphora.
(8) Wer
who
kaufte
bought
wasi
what
und
and
verschenkte
gave away
esi
it
sofort?
immediately
(German)
literally: ‘Who bought whati and gave iti away immediately?’
To see that (8) indeed exhibits discourse anaphora, note that in-situ wh-phrases do
not undergo covert phrasal movement in German (see Pesetsky 2000, Beck 2006).11
Hence, we can conclude that the pronoun es is not syntactically bound by the in-
situ wh-phrase was.12 Hence, es cannot receive a bound-variable interpretation.
Furthermore, note that (8) can be given the pair-list answer in (9).
(9) MARIA kaufte [einen SCHAL]i und verschenkte ihni sofort,
PAUL kaufte BLUMENj und verschenkte siej sofort, ...
‘MARIA bought [a SCARF]i and gave iti away immediately,
PAUL bought FLOWERSj and gave themj away immediately, ...’
This shows that the anphoric binder was and the anaphoric pronoun es are in the
scope of the same question-formation operator. Below we will see that this operator
(denoted by the interrogative complementizer) lends universal force to the question
words in its scope.
I take the above observations to show that question words denote dynamic
existential quantiﬁers. Another reason for this assumption is that it leads to a variant
of the partition theory of questions (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982) that allows us
to integrate the semantic assumptions of the two previous sections into a coherent
theory. The dynamic-semantic variant of the partition theory and its properties are
discussed in the remainder of this paper.
3. A Dynamic-Semantic Variant of the Partition Theory of Questions
3.1. A Preview of the Translation of Wh-Questions
I assume that in wh-ex-situ languages, simple wh-questions have an LF structure as
exempliﬁed in (10) for the the question “Who called?”.
(10) [CP C[+Q] [FocP who 
Fe [TP t  called]]]
11For a discussion of relevant data, see section 5.
12I assume that (8) has the LF structure sketched in (i).
(i) [CP wer  [&P [FinP t  kaufte was  ][ &  und [FinP t  verschenkte es  sofort]]]]
In (i), the ex-situ wh-phrase wer moves across-the-board from a coordinated structure of two FinPs
(for this category, see Rizzi 1997).
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riving (10). Let me simply point out that the interrogative complementizer C[+Q]
c-commands the wh-phrase even after it underwent movement into the left periph-
ery of the clause. This movement is triggered by the wh-feature and the Fe feature
of the wh-phrase (in combination with properties of the left-peripheral heads).13
I assume that C[+Q] denotes an operator deﬁning a partition of the set of
indices. I.e., C[+Q] is translated as follows (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982).
(11) C[+Q]    p  j(p(i)   p(j))
This means that the LF structure in (10) translates into the term derived in (12)
(where a trace tn translates into the variable  n and a constituent [ n  ] translates
into  n
 ( i  n.  )).14
(12) (10)   C[+Q] ( i([Fe
 ( i.who 
 )]( i   .call (i)(  ))))
=   j( u (u  =   .call (i)( ))    u (u  =   .call (j)( )))
In classical type logic, the  -term derived in (12) does not represent the
extension of a wh-question, which rather must be represented by a term of the fol-
lowing form (modulo logical equivalence).
(13)   j( x ... xn.  =  x ... xn. )
However, it can be shown that there is a denotational equivalence between (13) and
the term in (14),15 namely if the existential quantiﬁer and the biconditional operator
are interpreted as dynamic operators (see Haida 2005, 2007).16
(14)   j( x ... xn.¬¬     x ... xn.¬¬ )
In a nutshell, the reason is this: The meaning of dynamic-logic formulas consists
in their context change potential (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991). The context
change brought about by an existential formula  x.P(x) affects the value of x in
subsequent formulas, namely in the following way. If an assignment for x validates
P(x), thisassignmentpersistsasapossiblevalueofxinsubsequentfreeoccurrences
of this variable. Hence, what constitutes the context change potential of  x.P(x) is
the totality of assignments for x that validate P(x). This means that the following
equivalence holds (where   is the dynamic equivalence notion):
 x.P(x)    x.Q(x)
iff
 x.P(x)= x.Q(x)
Therefore, (14) is denotationally equivalent to (13) if ‘ ’ is the dynamic existential
quantifer and ‘ ’ is the object-language correlate of ‘ ’.
13Remember that there is strong typological evidence that question words must be focused and,
more speciﬁcally, that they bear the feature Fe (for a systematic exception, see section 4.2). There-
fore, it is reasonable to assume that ex-situ question words are focused even though there is only
indirect phonological evidence for this. See Haida (2007) for a thorough discussion.
14The underlining of the translation of the verb will be explained in section 3.3.2.
15The double negation in (14) serves to hide the context change potential of   and  .
16Groenendijk and Stokhof (1992: 122) already note that “it makes no difference whether we deal
with wh-terms as a form of restricted  -abstraction, or as dynamic existential quantiﬁcation.”
380 Andreas Haida3.2. The Dynamic Type Logic MTy3
3.2.1. Introduction
In the following sections, I will provide the speciﬁcs of a dynamic logic that al-
lows us to model the derivation of wh-question denotations. I will adopt one of the
existing approaches, Muskens (1996), and adjust it to our needs. With reference
to DRT,17 Muskens shows that dynamic predicate logic can be reduced to classical
type theory, that is, he demonstrates that it is possible to represent the dynamics of
DRT in terms of ordinary type logic. Against the background of this fact, Muskens
convincingly argues that DRT expressions are best treated as abbreviations for type-
logical expressions. This way, Montague Semantics and Discourse Representation
are combined into a formalism that is both easy to use and mathematically rig-
orous. Below, I provide an implementation of this idea which follows Muskens’
proposal in all respects except for the syntax of the dynamic-logic constructs: I will
use the usual formula notation instead of Muskens’ linearized DRT notation. The
implementation is achieved (i) by specifying the type logic that serves as the target
language into which the abbreviations are translated and (ii) by specifying how to
translate the abbreviations. The reduction of dynamic predicate logic to classical
type theory requires speciﬁc properties of the targeted type logic. The stipulations
in the following two subsections ensure that the type system and the semantic mod-
els used for interpretation are suitable for our purposes.
3.2.2. The Type System
First, we need a type-logical correlate of what is referred to as context in dynamic
predicate logic. Let us therefore assume that our type logic has a primitive type
for contexts. Beyond this, we need primitive types for entities and possible-world
indices. Thus, we assume three primitive types beyond t: the type of entities e, the
type of indices s, and the type of contexts c.18 Accordingly, we take Type, the set
of types of our logic, to be the smallest setY such that (i) e,s,c,t  Y, (ii) whenever
a,b  Y,  a,b  Y.
As usual, the set of types is correlated with a family of sets of possible
denotations. To be speciﬁc, let D, S, and C be pairwise disjoint, non-empty sets,
which we regard as the set of entities, the set of indices, and the set of contexts,
respectively. Then Da, the set of possible denotations of type a, is deﬁned over D,
S, and C in the following way: De = D, Ds = S, Dc = C, Dt = { , }, and
D a,b  = Db
Da.
As will be explained shortly, contexts come into play in connection with
semantic objects called registers. Registers are functions from contexts to entities,
17See Kamp and Reyle (1993).
18In Muskens (1996), contexts are called states and assigned the type s. However, this clashes
with the usual convention to designate by s the type of indices. Since we need both, indices and
contexts, we use s for indices and c for contexts.
THE INDEFINITENESS AND FOCUSING OF QUESTION WORDS 381that is, functions in D c,e .19 To characterize the purpose of these functions, let me
simply point out that register constants will later be called discourse referents.
The following table gives an overview of the symbols that will be used to
designate contexts and registers in the subsequent discussion.
contexts registers
type c  c,e 
variables k,k ,k ,k ,...  ,  ,  ,  ,...
constants – u,u ,u ,...
metavariables for
semantic objects  ,    ,  ,  ,...
metavariables for
terms k,k   ,  ,  ,...
Henceforth, we speak of the value of a register   in a context   to refer to the entity
 ( ). Furthermore, we speak of updating a register   to a value d when we mean
selecting a context   such that  ( )=d.
3.2.3. The Structure of the Semantic Models
For registers to serve their intended purpose, we need to impose a certain structure
on the semantic models we use for interpretation. To this end, we have to refer to a
speciﬁc subset of the set of registers D c,e , namely to those registers denoted by a
constant. Let us call these registers named registers, and let NMD be a predicate of
type   c,e ,t  that singles them out.20 We want to ensure that each named register
can be updated to any possible value without affecting the value of any other named
register. To be able to formulate this in a concise way, let us deﬁne an abbrevia-
tion:21 For all terms k and k  of type c and all terms   ,..., n of type  c,e , we
write
k[  ,..., n]k  for   ((NMD( )     =    ...  n  =  )    (k)= (k ))
According to this deﬁnition, a formula k[ ]k  expresses that the contexts denoted
by k and k  differ at most in the value of the register denoted by   whereby only
19In Muskens (1996), registers are atomic objects denoted by terms of another primitive type,  .
Terms of type   are related to terms of type  c,e  by means of a ﬁxed non-logical constant v of type
  , c,e  . Thereby, v(u)(k) is taken to be the value of register u in context k. I deviate from these
assumptions to spare the additional type  . This does not complicate Muskens’ approach, rather the
contrary.
20This means that for all M and all g, the denotation of NMD must be as follows:      D c,e  :
 NMD M,g( )=       ran(F), where F is the interpretation function of M. The set of named
registers corresponds to the range of the function denoted by v in Muskens’ original system. See fn.
19.
21Cf. Muskens (1996), p. 156.
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mention the restriction to named registers when referring to the above relation be-
tween contexts.) Now we can impose the following axiom on our semantic models
to enable the abovementioned register updates.22
Axiom 1  k   x(NMD( )    k (k[ ]k   (k )=x))
Axiom 1 demands that for each context, each named register, and each entity, there
is a second context that is just like the ﬁrst one, except that the value of the given
register is the given entity. To see the effect of axiom 1 on the structure of the
affected domains, let us consider a model satisfying this axiom: Assume for sim-
plicity that there are only three named registers,   ,   , and   .23 Then axiom 1
guarantees that for each triple  d ,d ,d   of elements of De, there is a context  
such that    ( ),  ( ),  ( )  =  d ,d ,d  . This is illustrated in table 1 below
for De = { ,•}. In table 1, the element in the nth row and mth column is the value
of  m in  n (that is,  m( n)).
Table 1
        
        
       •
     •  
     • •
   •    
   •   •
   • •  
   • • •
Table 2
x  x  x 
g       
g      •
g    •  
g    • •
g  •    
g  •   •
g  • •  
g  • • •
Now compare table 1 with table 2. The rows of table 2 are the graphs of all as-
signment functions on the restricted domain {x ,x ,x } (where x , x , and x  are
variables of type e). That is, the element in the nth row and mth column of table
2 is the value of gn applied to xm. The correspondence between table 1 and table
2 shows that contexts can be considered as model-theoretic counterparts of assign-
ment functions (if we disregard the reversal of the functor-argument relation with
respect to registers and variables, respectively).
A second axiom demands that all constants of type  c,e  denote different
registers. Let us call register-denoting constants discourse referents. Then the fol-
lowing axiom guarantees that an update on a discourse referent does not affect any
other discourse referent.24
22Cf. AX1 on p. 156 in Muskens (1996). Note that due to the differences mentioned in fn. 19,
we cannot simply adopt AX1. A further difference arises from the fact that Muskens distinguishes
between two kinds of registers: for indeﬁnites and for proper names. We will not use the latter kind
of register, and hence disregard this distinction.
23Note, however, that this assumption is incompatible with axiom 2 introduced below.
24Cf. AX3 on p. 156 in Muskens (1996). Note, however, that AX3 should read “v(un)  = v(um)
for each two different unspeciﬁc referents un and um .”
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We will refer to the type logic speciﬁed above as MTy  (Muskens’ Ty ).
This is in allusion to the fact that we are dealing with a three-sorted type logic and
that we only consider models that satisfy Muskens’ axioms 1 and 2.
3.3. Translating Dynamic Predicate Logic into MTy3
3.3.1. The Available Expressive Means
To demonstrate what has been achieved so far, I will now show how to represent in
MTy  the context change potential of the existential formula  x.walk (x).
Assume that u is a discourse referent (a constant of type  c,e ) and that k is
a context variable. Then the  -abstract in (15) is a meaningful expression of MTy .
(15)  k.walk (u(k))
On the assumption that u denotes the register  , (15) denotes (the characteristic
function of) the set of all contexts   such that  ( ) is an individual that walks.
Furthermore, axiom 1 guarantees that for each individual d, there is a context  
such that  ( )=d (remember that   is a named register,   being the denotation
of u). Consequently, it holds that for each individual d such that d walks, there
is a context   in the extension of (15) such that  ( )=d. This means that the
extension of (15) corresponds to the set S of satisfying assignments of the open
formula walk (x): S is the set of all assignment functions g such that g(x) is an
individual that walks; and for each individual d such that d walks, S contains an
assignment function g such that g(x)=d.
The correspondence pointed out above shows that context variables can be
considered as object-language correlates of assignment functions and can hence be
used to represent the context change potential of formulas of dynamic predicate
logic. In dynamic predicate logic, the context change potential of an existential
formula  x.walk (x) can be identiﬁed with its set of result contexts relative to an
assignment g, the set Sg (for simplicity, I omit reference to the model). An assign-
ment g  is an element of Sg iff (i) g and g  differ at most in the value assigned to x
and (ii) g (x) is an individual that walks. Furthermore, for each assignment function
g and each individual d such that d walks, there is an assignment function g    Sg
such that g (x)=d.
Now consider the MTy  term in (16), which will be shown to represent the
context change potential characterized by Sg.
(16)  k k (k[u]k  walk (u(k )))
The relation denoted by (16) holds between a pair of contexts   and    iff the fol-
lowing two conditions are met (where again we assume that u denotes  ): (i)   and
   differ at most in the value of   and (ii)  (  ) is an individual that walks. Fur-
thermore, we can derive from axiom 1 that for each context   and each individual
d such that d walks, there is a context    such that   ,    is in the extension of (16)
and  (  )=d.
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tial formula  x.walk (x) (if, as we have done, we associate u with x).
3.3.2. The Abbreviations
To highlight the relationship pointed out above, let us refer to the term in (16) and,
generally, to terms of type  c, c,t   as dynamic formulas. I will now deﬁne some
abbreviations that allow us to designate dynamic formulas in a manner that shows
their relation to corresponding formulas of dynamic predicate logic.25
First, we need a simple way of designating dynamic formulas that corre-
spond to atomic formulas of dynamic predicate logic. Therefore, let us agree on the
following: If R is a constant of type  s,ent  (where e0t = t and ek+1t =  e,ekt ), i
is a term of type s, and   ,..., n are terms of type  c,e , we write
Abbr.1 R(i)(  ,..., n) for  k k (k = k  R(i)(  (k),..., n(k))).
This abbreviation convention is illustrated in 17 (where u is a discourse referent and
  and    are register variables).
(17) a. walk (i)(u) is short for  k k (k = k  walk (i)(u(k)))
b. love (i)( ,  ) is short for  k k (k = k  love (i)( (k),  (k)))
To designate dynamic formulas that correspond to complex formulas of dynamic
predicate logic, we agree on the following: If   and   are dynamic formulas and u
is a discourse referent,26 we write
Abbr.2 ¬  for  k k (k = k  ¬ k . (k)(k )),
(   ) for  k k (k = k   k ( (k)(k )  (k)(k ))),
(     ) for  k k (k = k   k ( (k)(k )    k . (k )(k ))),
(     ) for  k k (k = k   k ( (k)(k )   (k)(k ))),
 u  for  k k (k = k   k (k[u]k     k . (k )(k ))),
Abbr.3  u  for  k k . k (k[u]k   (k )(k )),
(   ) for  k k . k ( (k)(k )  (k )(k )).
The above list is organized in such a way that Abbr. 2 subsumes the externally static
25Cf. Muskens (1996), p. 157. Muskens uses linearized DRS boxes to abbreviate dynamic
formulas. This way, no confusion can arise by mistaking the abbreviations for ordinary formulas.
On the other hand, it is (at least for me) somewhat difﬁcult to grasp the meaning of these expressions.
The format I propose allows to read the abbreviations as if they were DPL formulas (Groenendijk
and Stokhof 1991).
26At ﬁrst sight, an expression of the form  u  appears to express something nonsensical, namely
quantiﬁcation over a register constant. However, notice that the quantiﬁcation is over context vari-
ables in the underlying MTy  expression. Therefore,  u  is best pronounced as “there is an update
of the register denoted by u that satisﬁes  .” The same comments apply to the abbreviation  u ,
which is best pronounced as “every update of the register denoted by u satisﬁes  .”
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tions are direct translations of how the sematic value of the corresponding DPL
formulas is deﬁned.28 Therefore, we can be sure that, for instance, the dynamic
formula abbreviated by (   ) is in fact the dynamic conjunction of   and  .
If no confusion can arise, we will speak of the abbreviations conforming to
Abbr. 1–3 as of actual expressions of our logic.
3.4. Some Logical Properties of Dynamic Formulas
Dynamic formulas denote functions from contexts to (characteristic functions of)
sets of contexts. In other words, dynamic formulas denote their context change
potential. The logical notions of truth, validity and equivalence must be deﬁned ac-
cordingly. Speciﬁcally, the notion of truth of a dynamic formula   must be deﬁned
relative to a context  :29
Deﬁnition 1 (Truth)
  is true with respect to g and   in M       :    M,g( )(  )= .
The notion of validity is deﬁned as truth with respect to all models, assignments,
and contexts:
Deﬁnition 2 (Validity)
  is valid    M g   :   is true with respect to g and   in M.
Since dynamic formulas denote their context change potential, the notion of logical
equivalence can be deﬁned by sole reference to their extension:
Deﬁnition 3 (Equivalence)          M g :    M,g =    M,g .
Then we ﬁnd that ‘ ’ is the object-language correlate of ‘ ’:
Fact 1               is valid.
3.5. The Translation of Wh-Questions
By following Muskens in deﬁning our dynamic-logic constructs, we avoided leav-
ing the realm of ordinary type logic. Therefore, we now have at our disposal the full
power of  -abstraction. The translations of the relevant lexical items (and the rules
of composition) have already been presented in the previous sections. However, at
the point they were introduced, the semantic type of these translations could not be
clearly stated. This is made up for in the following table. Below, we abbreviate
27For simplicity, we assume that the biconditional operator is externally static. See section 2.3 for
a problematization of this assumption.
28See deﬁnition 2 in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991). This holds with the exception of the bicon-
ditional operator, which, as already mentioned, is not deﬁned in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991).
29Cf. Muskens (1996), p. 172.
386 Andreas Haida c, c,t   as t and  c,e  as e. That is, we say that dynamic formulas are of type t
and that discourse referents and register terms are of type e. With these notational
conventions, we highlight that the MTy  translations are isomorphic to their (non-
dynamic) Ty  counterparts.
MTy  translations of some lexical items (mostly repeated from above)
LI Translation Type
C[+Q]    p  j(p(i)   p(j))   s,t , s,t  
whon    P. un.P(i)(un)   s, e,t  ,t 
Fe    Q P.Q(i)( i   (   =   .P(i)( )))    s, e,t  ,t ,  s, e,t  ,t  
call     .call (i)( )  e,t 
4. Accounting for Presuppositions of Wh-Questions
There is a number of answerhood conditions that are not accounted for by the perti-
nent semantic theories of questions (for an overview and a descriptive account, see
Dayal 2002). In the following sections, I will identify these answerhood conditions
as presuppositions triggered by Fe features of question words.
4.1. The Existential Presupposition of Simple Wh-Questions
It is often assumed that simple wh-questions have an existential presupposition: By
asking “Who called?”, the questioner presupposes that someone called (see, among
many others, Keenan 1971). This assumption is sometimes challenged by pointing
out that (18-A) is a coherent reply to the question in (18-Q).
(18) Q: Who called?
A: No one called.
However, the coherence of this reply does not show that it is a (semantic) answer
to the question posed. It is well known that negations can be used to protest against
a presupposition. Hence, (18-A) could be a protest against the existential presup-
position of (18-Q). In my view, the inadequacy of the reply in (19) provides more
conclusive evidence for judging the correctness of the assumption under discus-
sion.
(19) A: # Someone called.
If (18-Q) did not presuppose that someone called, the reply in (19-A) would be an
informative answer, as it rules out the possibility that in fact no one called. How-
ever, (19-A) seems to be inadequate precisely because it is a completely uninforma-
tive reply. Therefore, I assume that simple wh-questions have indeed an existential
presupposition.
This is predicted by the analysis presented above. As detailed in section 3.1,
(18-Q) has the LF structure in (20a), which is translated into the term in (20b).
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Fe [TP t  called]]]
b.   j( u (u  =   .call (i)( ))    u (u  =   .call (j)( )))
Note that the  -terms in (20b) are deﬁned only if someone called at the respective
index. Hence, the intension of (20b) only deﬁnes a partition of a subset of the set of
indices, namely of those indices i for which it holds that someone called at i. This
means that (20b) captures the existential presupposition of (18-Q).
4.2. The Pair-list Presupposition of Multiple Wh-Questions
In the following paragraphs, I will argue that the pair-list (or rather tuple-list) pre-
supposition of multiple wh-questions arises from the distribution of Fe features in
these questions.
In Hungarian, there is only one preverbal focus position. This is shown by
the fact that a phrase preceding the immediately preverbal phrase, as for example
the phrase J´ anos in (21), cannot receive a focal interpretation (cf. ´ E. Kiss 1991).
(21) J´ anos
John.NOM
Marit
Mary.ACC
kis´ erte
escorted
haza.
home
a. * ‘It was Mary that JohnFoc escorted home.’
b. ‘As for John, it was Mary who he escorted home.’
Consequently,30 a wh-phrase cannot precede a preverbal phrase, as is shown by the
unacceptability of (22) (cf. Suranyi 2002).
(22) * Mit
what.ACC
Marinak
Mary.DAT
adott
gave
J´ anos?
John.NOM
intended: ‘What did John give to MaryFoc?’
However, there is a systematic exception to this generalization: In multiple wh-
questions, more than one wh-phrase can appear preverbally. This is exempliﬁed by
the questions in (23) (see ´ E. Kiss 1998: 263, n10).
(23) a. Ki
who
mit
what.ACC
hozott
brought
Marinak?
Mary.DAT
‘Tell me about each person what he brought for Mary!’
b. Mit ki hozott Marinak?
‘Tell me about each object who brought it for Mary!’
This suggests that the distribution of Fe features in (23a) and (23b) is as given in
the (simpliﬁed) LF structures in (24a) and (24b), respectively (where   is some
projection in the left periphery, possibly TopP).
(24) a. [CP C[+Q] [  ki  [FocP mit 
Fe [TP t  hozott Marinak t  ]]]]
b. [CP C[+Q] [  mit  [FocP ki 
Fe [TP t  hozott Marinak t  ]]]]
30See section 2.2.
388 Andreas HaidaCrucially, in both LF structures only one of the wh-pronouns bears an Fe feature,
namely the immediately preverbal one.
Now note that the questions in (23) differ in meaning although both ask
for a list of buyers paired with the things they bought. It is reasonable to assume
that the performative paraphrases given in (23a) and (b) reﬂect different pair-list
presuppositions, the presuppositions in (25a) and (b), respectively.
(25) a.   For every x, there is a y such that x brought y for Mary.
b.   For every y, there is an x such that x brought y for Mary.
I will now show that (25a) and (b) are presuppositions of the denotations of the
LF structures in (24). The translation of (24a) and (b) is given in (26a) and (b),
respectively (where mary is short for  k.mary and mary is a constant of type e).
(26) a. (24a)   C[+Q] ( i(ki 
 ( i   ([Fe
 (mit 
 )]( i   .TP )))))
= C[+Q] ( i. u  u (u  =   .bring (i)(u ,mary, )))
=   j( u  u (u  =   .bring (i)(u ,mary, ))  
   u  u (u  =   .bring (j)(u ,mary, )))
b. (24b)     j( u  u (u  =   .bring (i)( ,mary,u ))  
   u  u (u  =   .bring (j)( ,mary,u )))
Consider the MTy  term derived in (26a) (repeated in 27).
(27)   j( u  u (u  =   .bring (i)(u ,mary, ))  
   u  u (u  =   .bring (j)(u ,mary, )))
Note that on both sides of the biconditional operator, the dynamic existential quan-
tiﬁer  u  binds an occurrence of u  within a  -term. The dynamic biconditional
operator requires that the formulas in the scope of  u  are equivalent for all valu-
ations of u . Consequently, the biconditional in (27) is deﬁned only if everybody
brought something for Mary at the indices assigned to i and j. Hence, the intension
of (27) deﬁnes only a partition of a subset of the set of indices, namely of those
indices i for which it holds that everybody brought something for Mary at i. This
means that (27) captures the pair-list presupposition of (23a).
In the same way, it can be shown that the MTy  term in (26b) captures the
pair-list presupposition of (23b), that is, the presupposition in (25b).
4.3. Other Presuppositions of Wh-Questions
Other presuppositions of simple and multiple wh-questions – e.g., the uniqueness
presupposition of singular which-questions (see 28) – follow in the same way.
(28) a. Which student called?
b.   One and only one student called.
For reasons of space, this cannot be shown in detail here. Let me simply mention
that (28b) is a presupposition of (29b), which is the MTy  translation of the LF
structure in (29a) (for details, see Haida 2007).
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Fe student] [TP [DP which 
Fe student] called]]]
b. C[+Q] ( i. u (At(u ) u  =   (student (i)( ) call (i)( ))))
To achieve this result, it is crucial that singular which-phrases of the form whichn  
receive the translation in (30).
(30) whichn      P. un(At(un)   (un) P(i)(un))
Thereby, At(un) is the requirement that (the value of) un is an atomic individual in
the sense of Link (1983).31, 32
5. Accounting for Intervention Effects in Wh-Questions
The deviance of the constructions in (31) exempliﬁes a class of phenomena that are
known as intervention effects in wh-questions (Beck 1996, 2006).
(31) a. ?? Wer
who
hat
has
nicht
not
was
what
gelesen?
read
(German)
intended: ‘Who didn’t read what?’
b. * Minsu-man
Minsu-only
nuku-lˆ ul
who-ACC
po-ass-ni?
see-PAST-Q
(Korean)
intended: ‘Who did only Minsu see?’
I adopt the assumption of Pesetsky (2000) that intervention effects can be obviated
by covert phrasal movement. Then the deviance of (31a) and (b) shows that in
Korean and German, in-situ wh-phrases do not undergo covert phrasal movement.
Thus, intervention effects arise in the following LF conﬁguration (Beck 2006).
(32) * [ C[+Q] [...[ intervener [...wh-phrase...]]...]]
In (32), C[+Q] is the licensing complementizer of the wh-phrase, and the intervener
belongs to a class of expressions containing (counterparts of) the following ele-
ments: (i) focusing elements such as only, even, and also; (ii) quantiﬁcational ele-
ments such as (almost) every, most, always, often, and the sentence negation not.
There is already a number of semantic approaches that aim to explain in-
tervention effects in wh-questions. However, none of these approaches is fully sat-
isfactory. The focus-semantic approach of Beck (2006) struggles with some of
the quantiﬁcational interveners and cannot account for the indeﬁnite-interrogative
31At( ) is short for  k k (k = k    x(x  (k)   x =  (k))).
32The contrast in (i) shows that wh-pronouns allow for a plural interpretation even though they
are morphosyntactically singular.
(i) a. I wonder who is talking to one another (in the room next door).
b. * I wonder which person is talking to one another (in the room next door).
Note that speakers of American English tend to judge (i-a) as unacceptable too. This suggests
that for these speakers, reciprocals must have an antecedent that is morphosyntactically as well as
semantically plural.
390 Andreas Haidaafﬁnity. The dynamic-semantic approaches of Honcoop (1996), Butler (2000) and
Haida (2005) fail to account for the intervener status of focusing elements. More-
over, these approaches only predict the distribution of intervention effects and re-
quire an additional stipulation to account for the deviance of constructions of the
form in (32) (see also Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002).
I will show in the following that the deviance of (31a) and (b) is straightfor-
wardly accounted for by the analysis presented in this paper. First, consider in (33)
the simpliﬁed LF structure of (31a) (represented using the English glosses).
(33) [CP C[+Q] [FocP who  [vP not [vP t  [VP what 
Fe read]]]]]
The translation of (33) is given in (34).
(34) C[+Q] ( i. u 
        
¬ u (u  =   .read (i)(u , )))
With respect to (34), we observe the following. Due to the presuppostion of the
 -operator, the dynamic formula   is false (in all contexts) if it is deﬁned. More-
over, due to the negation,   does not have context change potential. That is,   is
semantically inert. Hence, the intension of (34) deﬁnes the trivial partition of the
subset of indicies on which it is deﬁned. This means that (33) does not give rise to
a proper semantic question, and this explains the deviance of (31a).
Now consider the LF structure of (31b), which is given in (35) (using the
English glosses).
(35) [CP C[+Q] [TP Minsu-only  [VP who 
Fe saw]]]
IassumethataDP  sufﬁxedwith-man‘only’receivesthefollowingtranslation.33
(36)  -onlyn    P( un(P(i)(un)   un is   )  P(i)(  ))
Thereby, ‘ ’ is (the dynamic version of) Beaver’s partial operator (Beaver 2001).
According to this assumption, (35) has the translation given in (37).
(37) C[+Q] ( i( u ( u (u  =   .see (i)(u , ))   u  is minsu) 
   u (u  =   .see (i)(minsu, ))))
With respect to (37), we observe the following. Due to the  -operator, the exis-
tential formula in the scope of the universal quantiﬁer is true for all valuations of
u  if it is deﬁned. Hence, if there is an individual other than Minsu, the universal
formula is false if it is deﬁned. Thus, the conjunction in (37) does not have context
change potential. This is trivially the case if, otherwise, Minsu is the only individ-
ual. Hence, the intension of (37) deﬁnes the trivial partition of the subset of indices
on which it is deﬁned. Thus, (35) does not give rise to a proper semantic question.
In Haida (2007), it is shown that this analysis extends to all of the quantiﬁ-
cational interveners and to the focusing element even. However, it remains to be
shown how to account for the intervener status of also.
33  is    is short for  k k (k = k   (k)=  (k)).
THE INDEFINITENESS AND FOCUSING OF QUESTION WORDS 3916. Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper took as its starting point two typological ten-
dencies and another, related empirical phenomenon. The phenomena considered
were semantically analyzed in a straightforward manner and an integration into ex-
isting semantic frameworks could be achieved. In addition to this, it was shown
that the proposed analysis explains a number of other signiﬁcant properties of the
constructions under consideration.
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